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The urge to punish those who disseminate sexually explicit material is
overwhelming. To illustrate, in the Sable Communications case,' the
Supreme Court was faced with a congressional statute forbidding the
interstate telephonic communication of any indecent or obscene message
to any person, regardless of age.2 In this essay, I shall examine the
rationale for this urge to punish and the extent to which such urge can be
implemented consistent with sound First Amendment theory.
There are at least three different concerns motivating those who
would limit the dissemination of sexually explicit material: the antisocial
behavior engendered by exposure to the material, the exploitation of
those who participate in production of the material, and the quality of
community life in and around commercial outlets which disseminate
such material. My conclusions, which will be developed in this essay,
are: (1) if obscenity is speech, any antisocial behavior engendered from
reading or watching it should not count as a harm to be balanced against
the First Amendment; (2) obscenity should be treated as speech; (3)
exploitation of participants should be punishable, but, except in the case
of minors, should not be presumed; and (4) a law that channels sexually
explicit speech without significantly impairing its availability should be
constitutional.
* Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; J.D.
Boston University, 1963; L.L.M. Harvard, 1964. The author would like to thank
Professors Gene Nichol, Fred Schauer, Michael Tigar, and William Van Alstyne, who
read and commented on an earlier draft of this essay. Thanks are also due to research
assistants Roland Reed, Charlton Torrance, Mark Melrose, Mark Davis, and Mark
Anders.
1 Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
2 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2) (1988) provides:
Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any indecent
communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
an activity prohibited by clause (i), shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
I. ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR
There is substantial, but not overwhelming, evidence that exposure to
obscenity causes antisocial or criminal behavior.3 If obscenity is not
speech, there is no question that this evidence warrants its suppression.4
That indeed is the current law of the land.5
If, however, obscenity is speech, the law seems quite clear that proof
of antisocial behavior emanating from it would not justify its suppression.
According to Brandenburg v. Ohio,6 even advocacy to commit crimes
cannot be punished unless it reaches the level of incitement to imminent
illegality.7 Although obscenity does, however obliquely, advocate sexual
and sometimes violent crimes, it does not approach the level of incitement
to imminent criminality required by Brandenburg.
The Supreme Court has never questioned this analysis. Rather, it has
held that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance."' 8 Proceeding
from that premise, the Court reached the logically impeccable conclusion
that obscenity is subject to legislative prohibition. If, however, obscenity
is speech, such a conclusion is incorrect. In examining the Court's
conclusion that obscenity is not speech, I shall analyze written obscenity
and pictorial obscenity separately because they involve potentially different
considerations.
II. WRI7rEN OBSCENITY
In Kaplan v. California,9 the Supreme Court explicitly held that
"expression by words alone can be legally 'obscene.' .... Statutes that
punish the dissemination of written obscenity are designed to deprive the
citizenry of access to ideas deemed offensive by the government. They
3 See generally, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT
(1986); cf. Edward I. Donnerstein, Aggressive Pornography: Can It Influence Aggression
Against Women, in PROMOTING SEXUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PREVENTING SEXUAL
PROBLEMS (George W. Albee et al. eds., 1983). But see U. S. COMM'N ON OBSCENITY
AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT (1970); EBERHARD KRONHAUSEN & PHYLLIS
KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959); Steven Alan Childress, Reel "Rape
Speech ' Violent Pornography and the Politics of Harm, 25 LAW AND Soc. REV. 177
(1991).
4 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
6 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
' Id. at 449.
8 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
9 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
10 Id. at 118.
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may not totally preclude the advocacy of licentious or perverted sex, but
they preclude a form of advocacy which, from an emotive perspective,
might be quite effective. Even if obscenity laws could be viewed as
ideologically neutral, they still limit the manner in which appeal can be
made to individual emotions."
Outside of obscenity cases, legislation that attempts to limit appeals
to emotion has fared little better than legislation attempting to limit
appeals to the intellect.' 2 For example, in Cohen v. California,3 the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a man for wearing a jacket with
the words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned thereon.' 4 In the course of its
opinion, the Court emphasized: "We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for the emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated."' 5 The Court has adhered
consistently to this approach, most recently affirming the right to bum the
American flag as a form of political protest 16 and the right to bum a cross
as a form of racial insult.'
7
Although the Supreme Court has not protected the emotive aspect of
sexually explicit speech, it has held that advocacy of sexually perverse
ideology cannot be proscribed. In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v.
Regents,'8 it invalidated an overtly ideological New York statute which
forbade the presentation of a movie because it portrayed adultery as
desirable social behavior. 9 In ringing terms, the Court held that the First
Amendment "protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may
" See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful,
the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 221; see also Steven G. Gey,
The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1564 (1988).
12 Except in schools. See Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986);
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
1" 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
14 Id. at 16.
"5 Id. at 26.
16 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990). See Arnold H. Loewy, The Flag-Burning Case: Freedom of Speech When We
Need It Most, 68 N.C. L. REV. 165 (1989).
17 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct.
2194 (1993). See generally, Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate
Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 673 (1993).
1" 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
'9 Although Kingsley involved a movie, no claim was made that any pictorial
representation was unlawful. Therefore, the case can be appropriately analyzed under
written obscenity.
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sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.
And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less
than that which is unconvincing. ' 20 Indeed, in finding obscenity to be
outside the scope of the First Amendment, the Court, in Roth v. United
States,2' clearly held that obscenity is unprotected, principally because it
is nonideological:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance .... "It has been well observed that such
[lewd and obscene] utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas .... 22
Even if the Court were correct in its assessment of the nonideological
character of obscenity, the Court, in Winters v. New York,23 had previously
granted constitutional protection to stories of violence that were so massed
"as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against
the person. ' ' 24 The Court, which could see no possible value in these
stories, nevertheless protected them, holding that "the line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [freedom
of speech]. '25 Although Winters explicitly excluded obscenity from its
libertarian sentiments,26 it did so by ipse dixit rather than by analysis.
Sexually explicit magazines are at least as likely to advocate an idea-the
joy of promiscuous sex, for example-as were the violent magazines in
Winters.27 Indeed, it is precisely because of such advocacy that many
obscenity laws are enacted.28
20 Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 689.
21 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
22 Id. at 484-85 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
23 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
24 Id. at 513.
25 Id. at 510. See Arnold H. Loewy, Freedom of Speech As a Product of Democracy
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 427 (1993).
26 Winters, 333 U.S. at 510.
27 See David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
28 See Arnold H. Loewy, Why the 1985 North Carolina Obscenity Law is
Fundamentally Wrong, 65 N.C. L. REV. 793, 795 (1987).
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Frederick Schauer has argued that obscenity is outside the First
Amendment because it appeals to one's physical rather than mental
processes.29 In Professor Schauer's view, an obscene book is more like a
sex aid than an item of literature. Consequently, he would argue that
whether or not sex aids are useful, they should not be protected under the
freedom of speech principle. The difficulty with Schauer's analysis is that
much literature is read for the physical reaction-laughter, euphoria, or
whatever-that one derives from it. Speech, obscene or otherwise, allows
one to have such physical feelings only after mental digestion of the
material. Martin Redish has astutely observed that "viewing pornography
is clearly distinguishable, for First Amendment purposes, from a vibrator,
just as the whoopee cushion is distinguishable from the Marx Brothers
movie. ' ' 30 Neither the vibrator nor the cushion is protected because each
bypasses the mental processes in achieving a physical reaction, whereas
both the obscenity and Marx Brothers movie achieve the physical reaction
via mental processes. Because neither Schauer nor anyone else31 has
adequately explained why the most sexually explicit literature should not
be treated as speech, the libertarian sentiments expressed in Winters ought
to apply to obscenity.
To justify prosecutions for written obscenity, the Court is forced to
make highly artificial distinctions based on prurient appeal. Kingsley
Pictures32 protected advocacy of adultery, but not if done in a prurient
manner; Cohen33 protected offensive but not prurient speech; and Winters34
protected violent but not prurient magazines. Kingsley and Cohen largely
cancel each other's limitations: If sexual misconduct can be advocated, as
in Kingsley, and advocacy can be offensive, as in Cohen, why can sexual
misconduct not be advocated in an offensive-that is, prurient-manner?
The Winters violence/obscenity distinction is even more perverse in that
most studies have shown explicit violence to be more harmful than explicit
sex.
35
29 See Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech '"-Obscenity and "Obscenity "- An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, 181-84 (1982).
30 MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 75 (1984).
3 For a similar attempt, see John M. Finnis, 'Reason and Passion'. The
Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1967).
32 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
33 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
34 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
31 See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 977-1007.
For example, one study showed that males who were exposed to a large number of films
depicting violent acts against women came to feel less sympathetic toward women, tended
to underestimate the violent nature of the males' acts, and began to evaluate such acts as
significantly less degrading to women. Subjects shown films that had received an "
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III. LIVE OR PHOTOGRAPHIC OBSCENITY
The potentially relevant distinction between written obscenity and that
which is live or photographic is that the latter injects an element of
conduct. Freedom to advocate sexual promiscuity does not necessarily
imply freedom to engage in sexual promiscuity. 36 It is important to
emphasize that it is only the actual conduct that arguably justifies a
different approach. Sexually explicit cartoons, drawings, or other
lithographs are not themselves violations of the law. Therefore, they should
be fully protected even when they depict such violations. Similarly,
moving or still photography of lawful activity should be fully protected.
It seems clear that the First Amendment does not protect the movie
producer's right to photograph everything. The law against murder
obviously reaches the production of a "snuff" film.37 Although it is less
clear, I assume that some form of government regulation on dangerous
stunts would be permissible on the theory that at some point lives are
worth more than realism. Similarly, sexually explicit performances, films,
or photographs might be controlled by indecent exposure, prostitution, or
sexual misconduct charges.38
Live performances would seem easiest to control because they involve
only the jurisdiction in which the performance is presented. Indecent
exposure statutes have occasionally been employed to convict nude dancers
and their sponsors.39 Whether such efforts will succeed is problematic. The
Supreme Court has not looked kindly upon efforts to ban all nude
dancing, 40 and that is precisely what such a statutory application does.
rating for sexual content only, however, experienced no such change in objectification of
women, acceptance of conservative sex roles, or rape myth acceptance. Id. (citing D. Linz,
Sexual Violence in the Mass Media: Effects on Male Viewers and Implications for
Society (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin)); see also
Childress, supra note 3; cf. Donnerstein, supra note 3.
36 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 182-83 (1982).
3' A film in which an actress is tortured and killed for the enjoyment of the audience.
38 It is unclear how much consensual activity is protected by the progeny of Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating statute restricting use of contraceptives
by married persons).
Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating statute prohibiting
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (upholding statute prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults). It is
doubtful that any of these decisions protect the public display of sexuality.
39 E.g., Erhardt v. State, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1984); State v. King, 201 S.E.2d 724
(N.C. Ct. App. 1974), modified on other grounds, 204 S.E.2d 667 (N.C. 1974). But see
Morris v. Municipal Court, 652 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1982), overruling Crownover v. Musick,
509 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974).
40 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); cf. Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (showing films containing nudity at a drive-in
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Furthermore, the government interest in preventing indecent exposure is
surely at its nadir when the "victim" of the exposure wishes to witness
it. Consequently, one would think that the First Amendment would
preclude application of such a statute to nude entertainment, at least where
exposure to children and nonconsenting adults is avoided. Nevertheless, in
a strangely convoluted opinion, Barnes v. Glen Theatres,4 the Court
upheld an indecent exposure statute as applied to barroom dancing and
other adult entertainment.
Because of the breakdown of the Court, however, it is difficult to
extrapolate much precedential value from the case. Justice Scalia, one of
the five votes necessary to uphold the statute, was prepared to do so only
because of the statute's generality. In his view, the statute applied to all
forms of public nudity.42 Consequently, he viewed the statutory prohibition
as unvarying regardless of the whether the nude was conveying an idea or
not. He voted to uphold the statute because of the perceived immorality of
public nudity.43
Justice Souter, another of the five votes required for a majority, was
prepared to uphold the statute only because of its nongenerality. In his
view, the statute only applied to nudity where harmful secondary effects
were likely to transpire.44 In other words, he perceived this regulation to
effect nude dancing establishments rather than nudity itself. Consequently,
he analyzed this case as one channeling public nudity rather than
forbidding it.45 Only on that basis was he willing to concur.
46
The upshot of Barnes is that five of the justices-Scalia and the four
dissenters-were unwilling to sustain a statute that made the legality of
public nudity depend on the character of the entertainment.47 But a
different five justices-Souter and the four dissenters-were unwilling to
sustain a statute that did not allow expressive nudity outside of the
unwholesome environs at issue in Barnes. Because of the uncertainty of
its application as well as the insubstantiality of its doctrinal underpinnings,
one can only hope that the viability of Barnes will be exceedingly short-
lived.
theater, thereby creating the chance for passers-by to have unwilling glances at nudity, did
not constitute an offense as long as the nudity was not obscene, at least as to minors). See
infra text accompanying notes 101-108.
41 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
42 Id. at 2463.
43 Id. at 2468.
4 Id. at 2469-70. Here he was relying on City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.
45 See infra text accompanying notes 90-130.
46 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
47 At least assuming that it was not obscene.
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The case for prostitution prosecutions is more arguable. Compensating
an actor or actress for sexual intercourse probably comes within the literal
definition of prostitution. On the other hand, this type of prostitution is
nowhere near so great a state concern as murder or even safe stunts.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that a state in which specific sexual activity is
either performed live or photographed could punish that activity as
prostitution.48 Should the Court so hold, it is conceivable that Congress
would enact federal prostitution statutes aimed at preventing such
performances nationwide. 49 Any such statute, however, would have so
great an impact on speech relative to the attenuated federal interest that its
constitutionality would be extremely doubtful.5"
A state in which photographed sexual activity is marketed may seek to
prevent its dissemination on the grounds that it was produced in violation
of local prostitution laws. This argument should fail. Not all jurisdictions
prohibit prostitution,51 and of those that do, it is likely that not all would
adopt the argument that such prohibition should apply to moving and still
photography. Even if the market state could positively identify the
producing state as one that deems this type of photography to constitute
prostitution, its argument would be limited to a "good neighbor" policy
justification; that is, it would contend that as a good neighbor, it should
48 See E. Edward Bruce, Comment, Prostitution and Obscenity: A Comment Upon the
Attorney General's Report on Pornography, 1987 DUKE L.J. 123; Lori D. Hutchins, Note,
Pornography: The Prosecution of Pornographers Under Prostitution Statutes-A New
Approach, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 977 (1986).
'9 Conceivably, the Mann Act could be applied to one who transported an actress
across state lines for such purposes. Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1988). Under the same
reasoning, an amendment to the Mann Act could presumably prevent the transportation
across state lines of photographed sexual activities.
It is already possible to prosecute those who transport obscene materials across state
lines, even for private purposes. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
Similarly, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1982) has been held to preclude importation of obscene
materials by private carriage. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123,
128 (1973).
50 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-08 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Whether the Court would consider any speech-suppressing animus on behalf of the
government to be relevant evidence would depend upon its choice of precedents. Compare
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (declining to find congressional motive to
punish speech in enactment of statute requiring men to carry draft cards) with Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana statute requiring schools to give
equal treatment to so-called "creation science" theories because legislative history
showed purpose of the statute was to further a specific religious viewpoint). See generally
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205 (1970).
" Nevada allows prostitution under some circumstances. NEV. REV. STAT. § 269.175,
(1979).
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not provide economic encouragement for prostitution in a sister state. In
view of the marginal interest of the producing state, this argument should
fail. Obviously, the result would be otherwise if the market state
prevented-as it should-dissemination of a "snuff" film.
A market state might also argue that sexually explicit photo-
graphs, unlike words, are unprotected conduct rather than speech.
Professor Schauer argues that since the First Amendment would not pro-
tect a person's right to hire two prostitutes to have sex with each other
for his personal gratification, it should not protect his right to achieve
the same result through use of film.52 To illustrate his point Schauer sug-
gests:
Imagine a motion picture of ten minutes' duration whose
entire content consists of a close-up colour depiction of the
sexual organs of a male and a female who are engaged in
sexual intercourse. The film contains no variety, no
dialogue, no music, no attempt at artistic depiction, and not
even any view of the faces of the participants.53
The reason we should protect such a film is the Winters observation about
the difficulty of distinguishing that which entertains from that which
informs.54 Undoubtedly this film can be, and in Schauer's illustration is,
employed to achieve orgasm.55 It also can be perceived as an illustrated
argument in favor of casual sex, wherein the producer emphasizes the
anonymity of the parties by focusing on their genitals to the exclusion of
their faces. While some might describe this construction of the movie
as absurd,56 the whole point of Winters is to prevent the judiciary from
making this kind of value judgment at all. Consequently, the likeli-
hood that much of the audience will use this movie as a masturbatory
device should not deprive it of First Amendment protection any more than
the magazines in Winters, which were protected despite the Court's
inability to "see [anything] of any possible value to society in
[them]. ..
52 SCHAUER, supra note 36, at 181.
53 Id.
54 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51 SCHAUER, supra note 36.
56 If I were wont to express myself in a manner similar to Paul Cohen or George
Carlin, I might have chosen a term other than "absurd." See Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978), infra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
" Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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IV. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Analysis of child pornography can differ from obscenity analysis only
insofar as live or photographic displays are concerned. As far as written
or illustrated accounts of sex and the six-year-old are concerned, the
Constitution should permit no limitation.5" Although the subject is almost
too revolting to discuss, it is no more revolting than the hate-filled ideas
of Nazi and Klan devotees, whose right to advocate genocide is
constitutionally protected. 59 The actual employment of children in such
material, however, is an altogether different issue. It should be clear
beyond peradventure that a state can preclude children from performing
sexually for a live audience or a camera. Although the state's interest may
not approach that of preventing the producer of a "snuff" film from
orchestrating a murder, it is infinitely superior to the need to control
consenting adults from receiving money for similar performances. Contrary
to Justice Brennan's analysis in New York v. Ferber,60 a finished product
that has "serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value ' 61 should
not justify the employment of children to perform sexually any more than
the need to build a better building could justify a construction company's
violation of a child labor law. A movie or play could satisfy its artistic
needs either by simulation, an adult double for the sexually explicit
62 6scene, or a young-looking adult portraying a child.63
The constitutional power of a market state to prevent dissemination is
more difficult. The good neighbor argument is much more powerful than
it was in obscenity. Each of the states forbids the production of child por-
nography, and the state interest in doing so is substantial. Furthermore, it
is frequently difficult to determine where a particular piece of child por-
nography was produced. Consequently, by outlawing it everywhere, the in-
58 A limitation on its dissemination to minors is, of course, a different issue. Compare
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (affirming conviction of shop owner for
selling "girlie" magazine to sixteen-year-old) with Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957) (reversing conviction for selling a book containing obscene language "tending to
the corruption of the morals of youth" to adult police officers).
'9 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). Although not more revolting than genocide,
child abuse is a more realistic concern. Even so, the First Amendment cannot be compro-
mised. See supra text accompanying notes 3-8; cf. infra text accompanying notes 80-88.
60 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
61 Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring). Arguably, Justice Brennan is referring merely
to dissemination of already produced material and not to production, but that is not clear
from his opinion. Compare Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York
v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 298 n.71, where the distinction is emphasized.
62 Stunt people typically double for stars in unduly risky scenes.
63 See Brief for Petitioner at 25, Ferber (No. 81-55).
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centive to produce it anywhere will be significantly reduced. For these
reasons, the Court in Ferber correctly upheld a statute forbidding the know-
ing distribution of material depicting sexual performances by children.
64
In his concurring opinion in Ferber, Justice Stevens raised the question
of a foreign movie which was a serious work of art, but which contained
a sexually explicit scene featuring a child actor who resided abroad. Justice
Stevens suggested that in such a case, "New York's interest in protecting
its young from sexual exploitation would be far less compelling than in the
case before us. The federal interest in free expression would, however, be
just as strong as if an adult actor had been used."' 65 Stevens does seem to
have a point, at least if the child's performance was lawful in the country
of its origin. Perhaps the best solution would be to allow the disseminator
of such material to prove that the material was lawfully produced in its
place of origin. 66 Because I take seriously the Winters admonition that a
judge should not condition constitutional protection on her own perception
of value, I would require only that the defendant prove that the material
was produced lawfully, and not that it was a serious work of art.
What about private possession of child pornography? Stanley v.
Georgia67 clearly holds that private possession of obscenity is con-
stitutionally protected. 68 Child pornography, however, is forbidden-not
because it is inherently unworthy of protection, but to protect the children
who are exploited in producing the material. At one level, it might seem
64 The Court "adjusted" the Miller test, see infra note 92, for child pornography
cases as follows: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so
in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
65 Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66 The burden would be allowed to be shifted because of the few places where such
performances would be lawful and the desire not to infringe upon areas of protected
expression. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness and Harm:
Balancing the Factors On Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283
(1987); cf. Schauer, supra note 61, at 298-99 (suggesting an approach of shifting the
burden to the defendant to prove the serious merit of the materials). Of course, one could
argue that the interest in preventing child exploitation is so great that the state should
proscribe the materials in any event, in order to discourage the country of production from
continuing the exploitation of children.
67 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
68 One could argue that the Court has not faithfully adhered to Stanley over the years.
See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (upholding prohibition on receiving
obscene materials through the mails); United States v. 12 200 Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973) (upholding prohibition on importing obscene materials from foreign countries);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (upholding prohibition on transportation of
obscene material even for private use). Nevertheless, the core holding has not been ques-
tioned.
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
perverse to constitutionalize the right to possess unqualifiedly worthless
(according to the Court) material, but punish possession of material that is
not unqualifiedly worthless. There is, however, no good reason to punish
private possession of obscenity. Contrariwise, criminalizing possession of
child pornography can help dry up the market, thereby reducing the
demand for, and hopefully the supply of, exploited children. On balance,
therefore, the Supreme Court's opinion in Osborne v. Ohio69 permitting
such prosecutions was correctly decided.
There is a scienter problem, however: How is a consumer of such
material supposed to know whether the photographs are really of children,
or whether, as the Court suggested in Ferber, they are adults pretending
to be children? Given the Ferber suggestion, we cannot just say: "If they
look like children, then, for purposes of prosecution, we will assume that
they are children." Perhaps proof that the defendant specifically asked for
or ordered photographs of children engaged in particular sexual activity
should suffice. Those statutes that make scienter irrelevant, however,
should be invalidated.7 °
V. FEMINIST-DENOMINATED PORNOGRAPHY
In recent years, some feminists have sought to control the proliferation
of what they define as pornography. Feminist-denominated pornography
differs from obscenity in that its focus is upon sexually explicit
subordination of women rather than prurience. Such a statute is both more
and less justifiable than an obscenity statute. It is more justifiable in that
it aims at redressing a serious harm, subordination of women, rather than
the much more trivial concern of pandering to the prurient interest. On the
other hand, it is more clearly and explicitly aimed at silencing a particular
viewpoint-the desirability of sexually subordinating women.7' One version
of such a statute was enacted in Indianapolis and invalidated by the
Seventh Circuit.72
69 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
70 "As with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some
element of scienter on the part of the defendant." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. A conviction
can, however, be predicated on recklessness, defined as a subjective awareness of the risk
that the photographs were of children. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 104; cf. Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123-24 (1974) (holding that statutory language
" 'knowledge' of, or 'reason to know' " satisfies scienter requirement for distribution
of obscene materials through the mails).
71 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Comment: Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-
Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461, 461-62 (1986).
72 American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
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Among other things, the Indianapolis ordinance sought to protect
actresses from being compelled to perform in sexually degrading movies.
Insofar as a law protects against actual kidnapping, rape, or extortion, the
statute seems unassailable, although unnecessary. For example, if an
actress could establish that she was subject to the kind of abuse described
by Linda Lovelace,73 her tormentor ought to be imprisoned for a very
long time under our present laws. If she cannot-or is afraid to-estab-
lish her claim, a new law forbidding the same conduct is not likely to
do much good. Although it is a closer question, a law precluding the
knowing dissemination of material produced by criminal threats against
one or more of the performers ought to pass constitutional muster under
Ferber.74
Much more problematic is the statute's conclusive presumption that all
women who perform in pornographic films do so involuntarily. 5 . At
bottom, this can represent no more than the views of the most zealous
proponents of the pornography approach, who simply cannot believe that
any woman would voluntarily consent to this sort of thing.76 One could, of
course, establish a juridical incapacity of any woman to consent, thereby
analogizing adult pornography to the child pornography condemned in
Ferber. Such an approach is rejected even by some of the proponents of
pornography legislation. For example, Cass Sunstein, a moderate proponent
of such legislation, rejects the Ferber analogy, contending that "[b]ecause
the people to be protected are women rather than children, . . . the claim
of universal legal involuntariness is untenable. ' 77 Indeed, it was not so
long ago that the law's tender mercies conclusively presumed that women
were unable to serve as barmaids, unless, of course, their fathers or
husbands were around to protect them.78 Let us hope that civil rights for
73 LINDA LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980).
71 Ideally, such a law should apply to all actors and actresses, not just those in porno-
graphic films. See Stone, supra note 71, at 471-72. There might be a special problem if
the movie producers did not apply coercion, but unbeknownst to them, an outsider did.
Whether a disseminator who subsequently learns of this third party coercion could be
precluded from disseminating the material is a more difficult question.
7' The Indianapolis ordinance made it no defense that no force or threats were used
to coerce the performance, or that the person photographed had previously posed for
pornography, or that the person was under contract and was paid for the performance, or
that the person had consented to the pornographic usage of the materials or knew that they
would be so used. American Booksellers Ass n, 771 F.2d at 325-26.
76 See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
71 Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 596.
78 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
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women have reached the point where a legislature cannot conclusively
determine how each and every woman wants to earn her livelihood.7 9
The other major purpose of pornography legislation is to prevent the
citizenry from acting upon the abhorrent message of the pornographers.
The short answer to this argument is that the First Amendment requires
that we take the risk. 80 One could-argue that it is not the idea-male sexual
dominance-but the offensive manner of presentation that the law seeks to
prevent. Even in the context of viewpoint-neutral legislation, Cohen would
appear to reject this mode of analysis. 81 But pornography is not
viewpoint-neutral; identical explicitness that sought to establish sexual
equality would not contravene the statute.82
According to Professor Sunstein's argument, however, because
anti-pornography legislation aims to prevent the harm that emanates from
viewing pornography, the legislation is harm-based rather than viewpoint-
based.83 Inasmuch as there is no motive for a government to suppress a
viewpoint unless that government believes that the expression is likely to
cause harm, Sunstein's argument would condemn all viewpoint-based dis-
crimination as harm-based. This argument proves too much. Most of his
examples, moreover, are channeling cases-for example, an ordinance
precluding sexually explicit entertainment in a residential neighborhood.84
His only examples of total prohibitions are in the area of commercial
speech, which is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.85
Because anti-pornography legislation is clearly a total prohibition on
a type of speech, it can be sustained only if we can justify an exception to
the First Amendment. In terms of repulsiveness, it is hard to make a special
case for pornography. As repulsive as the message is, it is not worse than
some of the stuff put out by the Nazis and Klan.86 Yet the case can be
made that Nazi and Klan literature appeals primarily to the lunatic fringe,
'9 In light of some decisions of the past 15 years or so, I am not sure that point has
been reached. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal-The Supreme Court
and Gender Classifcation Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C. L. REV. 87 (1981). The
applicability of equal protection to this aspect of the pornography statute was suggested
to me by Professor Sylvia Law.
80 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
81 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying
text.
82 See Stone, supra note 71, at 469; cf. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
83 Sunstein, supra note 77, at 612 et seq.
84 E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 ('1986). See infra notes 124-
30 and accompanying text.
85 E.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
86 For example, the news program 20/20 once presented a KKK publication containing
a cartoon advocating the moral propriety of killing Negroes. (ABC television broadcast,
July 9, 1986).
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whereas male sexual dominance is more acceptable to the rank and file
citizen. Consequently, more people are likely to identify with and accept the
message of pornography, rendering its dissemination more dangerous.
The difficulty with this argument is that it permits suppression of
repulsive speech precisely because its repulsiveness is not apparent to
enough people. This is not the theory behind the First Amendment. Rather
its theory is to make the repulsiveness apparent by more speech. Some
contend that more speech is impossible because pornography has made
women unbelievable. 7 The same argument could have been made about
the civil rights revolution. Blacks who had been demeaned, attacked by
dogs, and otherwise presented as sub-human, overcame their oppression
largely by speech. Because of that speech, groups such as the Klan are
now publicly scorned. Undoubtedly, those who would "take back the
night ' 8 8 have a similar capacity to educate the public.
The need for those committed to this important project is to reach more
people, not to silence their opposition. Although freedom of speech cannot
totally eliminate the sexist mentality, it can ensure that those who display
it become as ostracized as those who display racism are ostracized today. 89
VI. CHANNELING
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,90 the Court, in one of its rare efforts
to rationalize suppression of obscenity, focused on reasons relating to the
quality of life around the commercial distribution center: "These include
the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community
environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly,
the public safety itself."91 Because the definition of obscenity bears so
little relationship to the problem,92 some communities have preferred to
See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 76; Sunstein, supra note 77.
88 The title of a book compiled by several authors detailing the harm to women from
pornography. TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer ed.,
Morrow Quill Paperbacks 1980).
89 See Stone, supra note 71, at 480.
90 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
9' Id. at 58. Arguably the public safety interest could refer to violence inspired by
reading obscenity. In context, however, the Court appeared to be concerned about the
safety of a neighborhood that is overrun by the seedy characters that frequent "adult"
book stores.
92 In Miller v. California, the companion case to Paris Adult Theatre, the Court
announced:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
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focus on channeling sexually explicit material in lieu of, or in addition to,
prosecuting the dissemination of obscenity.
Channeling sexually explicit material is beset with some problems that
are irrelevant to the suppression of obscenity. If obscenity fails to achieve
constitutionally-protected status, as the Court (contrary to my good advice)
says it does, suppression presents no problem. Much sexually explicit
speech, despite its equal capacity to deteriorate a neighborhood, is
constitutionally protected. The core of much modem First Amendment
theory is that content-based discrimination among different types of
constitutionally-protected speech is anathema to the First Amendment.93
Consequently, it is argued that communities ought not be permitted to
channel sexually explicit speech from places in which other types of
speech are permitted.94
One argument in favor of channeling is that sexually explicit speech
should be deemed lesser value speech and consequently amenable to
channeling. Although some Supreme Court Justices95 and some fairly
diverse commentators 96 have endorsed this approach, it has failed to obtain
majority support. The better rationale for channeling only sexually explicit
speech is that it has a greater capacity to invade privacy or destroy
applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Whether the sexually explicit material appeals to the prurient
interest in whole or in part, whether it is patently offensive or just offensive, or whether
it has some literary or artistic value (which was not what the viewer came to see anyway)
has very little to do with the tone of commerce concerns expressed in Paris Adult Theatre.
The silliness of the obscenity standards was never more apparent than in the "dial-a-
porn" case. Indecent messages were held to be protected, but obscene ones were not.
Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The specter of overcrowded courts
deciding whether a particular dial-a-porn message is "patently" offensive or just of-
fensive is mind-boggling. I assume that "prurient" appeal would be less of an issue here
because if the messages were not "prurient,' the customer would want his money back.
" See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
9 See Frederick F. Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
1275, 1288-91 (1977); Karst, supra note 93.
" In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976), Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, considered sexually
explicit films to be lesser value speech and therefore more subject to channeling than
other types of speech. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), only three
Justices (Stevens, Burger, and Rehnquist, JJ.) endorsed the lesser value theory.
96 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 26-29 (1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute,
1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255. Although I once endorsed this approach, see Arnold H.
Loewy, A Better Test For Obscenity: Better for the States-Better for Libertarians, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1315 (1977), I prefer not to rely on it because it is not necessary to
establish the thesis that I am advancing and is fraught with difficulty.
486 [Vol. 2:2
OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY THEORY
neighborhoods than most other types of speech; therefore, it may be
subject to greater regulation.9"
Another powerful argument in favor of channeling is that the book
stores and movie theatres that are channeled are seldom seeking to convey
any particular message. Rather, they are commercial conduits, whose
raison d 'tre is to make money from disseminating whatever books and
movies will be most profitable. These conduits, of course, are entitled to
First Amendment protection because failure to provide such protection
would effectively prevent the dissemination of much constitutionally
protected material. The measure of such protection, however, ought to be
that which is necessary to ensure that book publishers and movie producers
have ample opportunity to reach their audiences.9 s From a free speech
perspective, this emphasis seems sound. At least so long as a conduit is
not personally interested in spreading a message, the constitutionality of
a law limiting its freedom ought to be measured by the impact of the law
upon dissemination of the material. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,99 which
allowed a publisher to challenge a prior restraint of book stores, supports
this proposition. That case recognized that although the statute nominally
burdened book stores, the real party in interest was the publisher who
stood to have its book removed by the compliant book store."°
Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to view a conduit as an
incidental beneficiary of a publisher's or producer's First Amendment
rights and to measure the conduit's rights accordingly.
The Supreme Court has been less than uniform in its treatment of the
relevant cases. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,'°' the Court invalidated
a Jacksonville ordinance that forbade projection of nude images that could
be seen from a public place outside of the theatre. Inasmuch as the state
can forbid indecent exposure to an unwilling viewer in a public place, one
could argue that such a person should be protected from exposure to the
much larger representation on the screen. Although this interest is not
overwhelming, neither is the interference with free speech. To be sure,
Erznoznik cannot show films containing nudity at his drive-in, but these
9' Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (holding-at least by
plurality-that commercial posters could be favored over political posters on a municipal
transit system in part because only the latter run the risk of apparent government endorse-
ment).
98 See Young, 427 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
99 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
'" Id. at 64-65 n.6. Cf. William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 263-65 (1982) (discussing Bantam Books
in the context of administrative licensing and subsequent punishment).
101 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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films could still be shown at all indoor theatres and all drive-ins that are
not visible to passersby. Nevertheless, the Court balanced the First
Amendment and privacy interests by requiring the offended passerby to
look the other way.'0 2 It also held that the ordinance could not be justified
as a traffic safety regulation. The Court indicated that even if the ordinance
had been limited to movies that were visible from the highway-which this
ordinance was not: "There is no reason to think that a wide variety of
other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap opera to
violence, would be any less distracting to the passing motorist."', , 0 3
Therefore, although suggesting that an ordinance requiring all movie
screens to be shielded from the highway would pass constitutional
muster,1°4 the Court refused to uphold this nudity-channeling ordinance.
Jacksonville, however, might be unwilling to require all theatres to
shield their screens from the highway because, contrary to the Court, the
city might conclude that soap opera and violence are not so distracting as
nudity, and therefore not worth the additional expense to the theatre. 05
After all, there are no indecent soap opera statutes."° Although equality
purists have hailed Erznoznik for its refusal to accept a content-based
classification, 0 7 I repeat what I wrote sixteen years ago:
[A]s a passenger in a car, I would feel safer knowing that
the driver was not seeing a nude scene while driving. To be
sure, I would rather that he or she not be distracted at all,
but if there were to be a distraction, I would feel safer
knowing that it was a fully clothed one.'08
The Court was more receptive to channeling in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, ° in which it upheld a Detroit ordinance forbidding the
establishment of an adult book store, adult movie theatre, or any one of
102 Part of the Court's concern was the overbreadth of the statute in forbidding such
nudity as a baby's buttocks. The opinion was not so limited, however. Indeed, it clearly
held that the state was powerless to prevent the projection of nude images to unwilling
viewers unless the movie taken as a whole was obscene at least as to minors. Id. at 213-
14.
103 Id. at 214-i5.
'o4 Id. at 215 n.13.
'0s See id. at 211-12 n.8 (citing Olympic Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Pagedale, 441
S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo. 1969) for the proposition that, at least in one case, the cost of shielding
the screen from public view was estimated at $250,000).
'06 Although aesthetically it might not be a bad idea to adopt such a statute, I doubt
that it would pass constitutional muster.
'07 See Karst, supra note 93, at 65-66; Schauer, supra note 94, at 1285.
108 Loewy, supra note 96, at 1319.
109 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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several other establishments, such as a pool hall, within 1000 feet of two
other such establishments. The statute was inspired by a study that had
determined that the concentration of such businesses within a single area
tended to foster urban decay. Four of the Justices-Justices Stevens, White,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger-relied in part on what they perceived
to be the lesser value accorded sexually explicit speech." 0 Justice Powell,
the fifth vote for upholding the statute, made no such assumption. Rather,
he upheld this channeling on the ground that no other type of speech
contributed to the problem of urban decay."'
In some ways, channeling was more justified in Young than it was in
Erznoznik. Privacy and highway safety, though serious concerns, do not
approach Detroit's interest in fighting urban decay. Furthermore, a more
encompassing ordinance-for example, one that would prohibit any drive-in
movie from being seen outside the theatre-would have better protected the
privacy and safety of the Jacksonville citizenry, even if on a cost/benefit
analysis such a sweeping statute would have been imprudent. On the other
hand, movies that were not sexually explicit did not threaten Detroit's
urban security at all. Consequently, limiting these films would have been
an arbitrary and useless act. Therefore, if Detroit was entitled to enact any
legislation limiting the dissemination of books and movies, its only
sensible option was the channeling ordinance that it adopted.
This is not to say that Young was an easy case. Because sexually
explicit books and movies tend to advocate promiscuity, whereas movies
containing nudity might advocate just about anything, Young approximates
viewpoint discrimination more closely than Erznoznik does." 2 Furthermore,
the argument that Detroit was concerned with secondary effects has to be
tightly cabined. I assume that a predominantly Republican town could not
justify a refusal to allow Democrats to operate a downtown office on the
ground that such an office would tend to attract "riffraff" who would
spoil the town's genteel image.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Young result was correct. Though
more viewpoint-specific than the Jacksonville ordinance, the Detroit
ordinance was nowhere near so viewpoint-specific as that of the
hypothetical Republican town. Furthermore, Young was explicitly premised
on minimal interference with the dissemination of books and movies. The
Democratic party-unlike American Mini Theatres, which is merely a
commercial conduit-has a direct First Amendment right to choose its locus
of operations. Given the documentation of harm, the disutility of an across-
110 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
..' Young, 427 U.S. at 82.
12 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 111-12 (1978).
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the-board limitation, and the assurance of adequate outlets for adult books
and movies, the channeling of sexually explicit entertainment was properly
sustained in Young.
The next case, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,'1 3 which upheld an FCC
warning to a radio station not to rebroadcast a twelve minute monologue
by George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words" during daytime hours, was far
more questionable. In two separate opinions, garnering a total of five
votes,'14 the Court concluded that in the context of a radio broadcast during
the daytime, the government's concern with invasions of privacy and
protecting children warranted this special channeling. Because indecent
speech was the only source of the problem, it was clear that if there was
to be a regulation at all, it would have to be limited to indecent speech.
The case for any regulation, however, was not powerful. Any home
owner could remove the offending broadcast with a flick of the switch.
The Court concluded that this "is like saying that the remedy for an
assault is to run away after the first blow."' 5 The Court analogized the
limitation to a law proscribing obscene phone calls, and distinguished
Erznoznik on the greater expectation of privacy one has in his home."l6
Because obscene phone calls can represent a direct threat to the
homeowner, they are hardly analogous. Furthermore, it could be argued
that a brief exposure to dirty words while flipping the dial is hardly more
of an assault to a person of genteel sensibilities than a similar exposure to
aesthetically unpalatable music. Finally, because the only complaint that
the FCC received about this broadcast came from a man listening to the
broadcast on his car radio, the special sanctity of the home seems
peculiarly irrelevant.
The protection of children rationale fares little better. Apart from the
absence of a determination that the Carlin monologue was obscene for
children, a sine qua non in Erznoznik,"7 there was neither evidence nor
reason to believe that very many children would be listening to the
broadcast at two o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon." 8 In fact, the only child
who was known to have heard the broadcast was the child of the man who
13 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
114 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, justified the
FCC's order in the context of a radio broadcast by reference to the low value of the
"patently offensive" speech which "lies at the periphery of First Amendment
concern." Id. at 743. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, specifically denied the
Court's power to decide the relative value of speech protected by the First Amendment,
id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); rather, he
adopted the "special harm" approach to justify the order. Id. at 762.
"' Id. at 749.
116 Id. at 749 n.27.
"7 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
18 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 937-38 (2d ed. 1988).
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was offended by listening to it on his car radio. Evidently, this man was
sufficiently concerned about the impact of the broadcast on his child to
complain to the FCC, but not sufficiently concerned to turn it off. One has
to think that the complainant's real concern was the failure of the
government to protect us from offensive speech-surely an illegitimate
concern19-rather than the more legitimate-sounding protection of children
or privacy. This is not to say that a more carefully tailored effort at
channeling, such as a prohibition of scatological speech on Saturday
morning television, might not be appropriate.
The Court's opinion was not totally insensitive to free speech. It did
emphasize the alternative places that a willing listener could hear the
monologue. Nevertheless, Pacifica sanctions a rather broad content-
channeling regulation for reasons that cannot withstand analysis. The
plurality may have been influenced by its view that "[a] requirement that
indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language."' 2 If one ignores the Court's prior 12' and subsequent
122
emphasis on the emotive aspects of speech, the plurality's general
proposition is basically correct. The ultimate irony in this case, however,
is that one of the few serious ideas that cannot be expressed without
offensive language is the silliness of prohibiting offensive language. Justice
Brennan characterized the Court's opinion as "confirming Carlin's
prescience as a social commentator .... ,,123 He has a good point.
The most recent case in this series, City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.,24 bears a surface resemblance to Young in that both cases
involved efforts to prevent neighborhood blight that the city believed
would be caused by the location of an adult theatre. Unlike Detroit,
however, which precluded only the clustering of adult theatres, Renton,
Washington, precluded any adult theatre from locating within 1000 feet of
a residential neighborhood, church, park, or school. Under this ordinance,
only 520 acres, or slightly over five percent, 2 5 of the entire city was
theoretically available for an adult theatre. The Ninth Circuit had
19 See Loewy, supra note 25.
12' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978).
121 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes
12-15.
122 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See supra text accompanying note 16.
123 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
25 In justifying the regulation, Justice Rehnquist described the 520 acres as "more
than five percent of the entire land area of Renton." Id. at 43. I assume that if it were
very much more, such as 10 percent, he would have said so.
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previously noted that "[a] substantial part of the 520 acres is occupied by:
(1) a sewage disposal site and treatment plant; (2) a horse-racing track and
environs; (3) a business park containing buildings suitable only for
industrial use; (4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities; (5) a Mobil
Oil tank farm; and, (6) a fully-developed shopping center."'' 26 Not
surprisingly, that court held that "[ilimiting adult theater uses to these
areas is a substantial restriction on speech."'
' 27
In an incredibly cavalier opinion, the Supreme Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, reversed the Ninth Circuit:
We disagree with both the reasoning and the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals. That respondents must fend for
themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing
with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give
rise to a First Amendment violation. And although we have
cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that
have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech," we have never suggested that
the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure
that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related
businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at
bargain prices. ("The inquiry for First Amendment
purposes is not concerned with economic impact"). In our
view, the First Amendment requires only that Renton
refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable
opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the
city, and the ordinance before us easily meets this
requirement. 28
Adjudication of cases involving channeling of sexually explicit speech
requires much greater sensitivity. Young drew a sharp distinction between
the availability of adult entertainment, which is protected, and the
opportunity of a particular theatre to disseminate the movies, which in
itself is not protected. Out of ignorance or sophistry, the Renton opinion
melds these concepts. The problem with the Renton ordinance is not that
Playtime Theaters may be foreclosed from the adult movie business; it is
the impossibility or extreme difficulty of any adult theatre's doing business
in Renton. Had Renton enacted an ordinance barring adult theatres from
126 Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984), rev a,
475 U.S. 41 (1985).
127 Id. at 534.
128 Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50,
71 n.35 (1976) (plurality opinion), 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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its community, I assume that such a statute would have been un-
constitutional.1 29 The Court should not allow the same result by
subterfuge. 130
The Supreme Court's vacillation in this area is disquieting. From its
refusal to take government arguments seriously in Erznoznik to its refusal
to take free speech interests seriously in Renton, the Court has come full
circle. Part of the inconsistency may be attributable to changes in Court
personnel. Justice Powell, however, was in the majority in all four
cases-Erznoznik, Young, Pacifica, and Renton. Powell's concurrence in
Young was the single outstanding opinion rendered in any of the four
cases. If the Court were to take that opinion with its carefully crafted
limitations seriously, Justice Powell could be remembered more for
contributing to the solution than for adding to the problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
Obscenity law, as the Supreme Court currently construes it, does not
comport with sound First Amendment theory. Nothing short of a complete
overhaul of the doctrine can correct the problem. Shortly after joining the
Court, Justice Scalia suggested as much.' Neither he nor any of his
colleagues, however, seem committed to such a task. Perhaps some day the
doctrinal bankruptcy of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence will become
apparent to a majority of the Court, but I see little reason to expect it.
129 Cf. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), in which the Court
invalidated a municipal ordinance banning all live entertainment in the community. But
cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 41-47.
130 Conceivably, the Court could have believed that the X-rated video-cassette business
was an effective substitute. Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that this is the case.
The argument that Renton residents could have gone to nearby Seattle to see adult films
is foreclosed by Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, where the Court stated: " '[O]ne is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' " Schad, 452 U.S. at 76-77 (quoting
Scheider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
131 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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